Introduction
The Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) was introduced by Lamport 4 ] as a logic for specifying concurrent systems and reasoning about them. One of the main di erences of TLA from other discrete time temporal logics is its unability to specify that one state should immediately be followed by the other state, though it can be speci ed that one state is followed by the other state at some later time. Lamport 3] argued in favor of this decision`The number of steps in a Pascal implementation is not a meaningful concept when one gives an abstract, high level speci cation'.
For example, programs like Pr 1 :: x := True; y := False and Pr 2 :: x := True; Skip; y := False are not distinguishable by the TLA speci cations, however, they are distinguishable in linear time temporal logic, one of the most popular temporal logics. As a consequence of the decision not to distinguish between`doing nothing and taking a step that produces no changes ' 4] , the language of TLA contains the next time operator in very restricted from. For the same reasons the TLA existential quanti er 9 TLA has a semantics di erent from the standard existential quanti er. One of our objectives is to investigate the expressive power of this quanti er. We will show that 9 TLA is not de nable in monadic second order logic over a discrete time structure.
On the other hand, we will show that 9 TLA`c orresponds' to the standard second order existential quanti er of monadic second order logic in a continuous time structure. Few comments on the status of monadic second order logic as a speci cation formalism are in order now. Many formalisms for specifying discrete time temporal behavior were considered in the literature, e.g., !-regular expressions, nite state automata, variety of linear time logics. One of the most expressive formalisms for which the equivalence of speci cations is still decidable is the monadic second order theory of order (we denote its language by L < 2 ) over the structure ! of natural numbers. The special status of L < 2 among all these discrete time formalisms rests on the fact that the speci cations in the formalisms mentioned above admit a clear (`compositional') reformulation in L < 2 12] . Despite the fact that !-regular expressions have the same expressive power as L < 2 , there exists no compositional translation from L < 2 into an equivalent !-regular expression. The language L < 2 of monadic second order logic of order contains individual variables, second order variables and the binary predicate <. In the structure ! (this structure will be de ned precisely in section 5), the individual variables are interpreted as natural numbers, the second order variables as monadic functions from the natural numbers into the booleans and < is the standard order on the set of natural numbers. We will also consider continuous time structures for L < 2 . In these structures the individual variables range over real numbers, the second order variables range over monadic functions from the reals into the booleans, and < is the standard order relation on the set of real numbers. In this paper we consider the fragment of Lamport's Temporal Logic of Action where variables can only receive boolean values (BTLA). First we investigate the question of existence of a meaning preserving translation from BTLA into L < 2 over the structure !. Our results are:
(1) There exists no compositional translation from BTLA into L < 2 over !. (2) There exists a translation from BTLA into L < 2 over !.
(1) will follow from (3) The TLA existential quanti er is not de nable 1 in L < 2 over structure !, As a by-product of (2) we obtain (4) The theory of BTLA in its standard discrete time model is decidable.
It is well known 9] that the monadic second order logic of order (L < 2 ) is undecidable over the structure of real numbers. We consider a substructure of real numbers which we call the signal structure. In the signal structure individual variables range over non-negative real numbers and the second order variables range over special boolean valued functions which we call signals. We show that (5) The L < 2 theory of the signal structure is decidable.
As opposed to (1), we show that (6) There exists a compositional translation of BTLA into L < 2 over the signal structure.
Moreover, in contrast to (3), in our translation the TLA existential quanti er is translated into the standard second order existential quanti er over signals.
Recall that the monadic second order logic is accepted as a kind of an universal decidable logic for specifying discrete time temporal behavior. (1)-(3) above show that TLA is not compatible with the monadic logic over discrete time. Together with some unexpected laws of BTLA (see section 3.3) and a non-logical nature of 9 TLA (see section 5.1), these indicate that Lamport's decision to provide the discrete time interpretation of temporal logic of action is not the most appropriate. On the other hand, (6) above shows that the signal (a continuous time) interpretation of TLA is compatible with the signal interpretation of the monadic logic. Moreover, (5) demonstrates that the signal interpretation of BTLA is decidable. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some notations and terminology. Syntax and semantics of BTLA are provided in section 3. In subsection 3.3 we also point to some unexpected inference rules that are sound in BTLA. Syntax and semantics of monadic second order logic of order L < 2 are given in section 4. In section 5 we investigate the interaction of 9 TLA with L < 2 in the structure !. We also provide a non-compositional meaning preserving translation from BTLA into L < 2 over structure !. Section 6 recalls results about two important continuous time structures for L < 2 and introduces the signal structure. In section 7 we introduce the notion of speed independence which is useful for explaining a relationship between signal and discrete time speci cations. Section 8 presents a compositional translation of BTLA into L < 2 over the signal structure. Section 9 states some further results. We will use the usual logical abbreviations, e.g., _ 0 = :( ^ 0 ) and $ 0 = ( ^ 0 ) _ (: ^: 0 ).
Usually the second order variables over a set X are interpreted as subsets of X. There is a one-one correspondence between the subsets of X and their characteristic functions. It will be a little bit more convenient for us to deal with characteristic functions instead of subsets. Hence we de ne a second order environment over a set X as a function from Var into monadic functions from X into the booleans. Let 2 fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! (Nat ! BOOL) be a second order environment for variables fx 1 ; : : : x n g over the set Nat of natural numbers. With associate the state sequence 0 = hs 0 ; s 1 : : : s k ; : : :i de ned as s k (x i ) = (x i )(k). The above mapping sets up one-one correspondence between the set fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! (Nat ! BOOL) of environment over natural numbers and the set Nat ! (fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! BOOL) of state sequences.
Also there exists a one-one correspondence between the set of !-strings over alphabet f0; 1g n and the set fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! (Nat ! BOOL) of second order environments for variables fx 1 ; : : :; x n g over the set of natural numbers. With an environment for variables x 1 ; : : :x n we associate the !-string a 0 a 1 : : : a k : : : over alphabet f0; 1g n de ned by a k = hb k 1 ; : : :b k n i where b k i is 1 if (x i )(k) holds and b k i is 0 otherwise.
To summarize we will use natural one-one correspondences between following three sets:
1. The set Nat ! fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! BOOL of state sequences. 2. The set fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! Nat ! BOOL of second order environments for the variables fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g over the set of natural numbers.
3. The set Nat ! f0; 1g n of !-strings over alphabet f0; 1g n An !-language is a set of !-strings. We will say that an !-language L over alphabet f0; 1g n is de nable by a formula (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) if L consists of all !-strings which`satisfy' in the sense de ned below.
Temporal Logic of Actions
We consider the fragment of Lamport's 4] Temporal Logic of Action where variables can only receive boolean values (BTLA).
Syntax
The symbol set of BTLA consists of: 
Semantics of BTLA
We are going to recall the de nition of the satisfaction relation between state sequences and a superset of BTLA formulas, which was called raw TLA by Lamport 4] . In the following de nition x denotes a BTLA variables and A denotes an action.
De nition 1 The satisfaction relation j = is de ned as follows: For an action A and a simple state formula p, the BTLA action formula 2 A] p is considered as an abbreviation of the raw TLA formula 2(A _ (p $ p 0 )), where p 0 the formula obtained from p by replacing every variable x by its primed version x 0 . Note that the set of sequences which satis es a BTLA formula is closed under stuttering, i.e., j = and ' 0 imply 0 j = . Remarks: (1) It is clear that the union and the intersection of stuttering closed sets of state sequence is a stuttering closed set of state sequence. Also the complementation of a stuttering closed set of state sequences is stuttering closed. (2) Note that the standard existential quanti er does not preserve stuttering closedness. This is the reason that the de nition of 9 TLA is di erent from the de nition of the standard existential quanti er. In de nition 1.7 of 9 TLA x stuttering equivalence up to x (' x ) is used whereas in the de nition of the standard existential quanti er 9x equivalence up to x (= x ) is used.
About TLA Existential Quanti er and Stuttering
Lamport argued (see 4]) that TLA existential quanti er \really is existential quanti cation because it obeys the ordinary laws of existential quanti cation. In particular, the usual rules : : : are sound. From these rules, one can deduce the expected properties of existential quanti cation, such as (9 TLA x:F _ G) $ (9 TLA x:F) _ (9 TLA x:G)". However, the design decision to combine in 9 TLA both the logical existential quanti cation and the non logical closure under stuttering has some unexpected consequences. For example, let (x) be a BTLA formula with only one free variable x and assume that 9 TLA x: (x) holds. Since every formula of BTLA de nes a stuttering closed set, it is clear that at least one of the following cases holds:
, where all the states of a su x n 1 of 1 assign to x the value 0.
2 j = (x)
, where all the states of a su x n 2 of 2 assign to x the value 1.
3. 3 j = (x), where all even states of a su x 2 n 3 of 3 assign to x the value 0 and all odd states of 2 n 3 assign to x the value 1.
One of the consequences of the above observation is that the following inference rule is also sound in BTLA:
A BTLA sound inference rule: From the conjunction of 9 TLA x: i (x), where i = 1; : : : ; 4 deduce the disjunction of (9 TLA x i x j : i (x i )^ j (x j )^32(x i = x j )), where 1 i < j 4 and 3 is an abreviation for :2: .
Lamport extensively comments that in TLA variables have no types and can assume any value 2 . He writes \This approach may seem strange to computer scientists used to types 2 He considers the full Temopral logic of Actions, in this paper we consider its boolean fragment.
in programming languages, but it captures the way mathematicians have reasoned for thousands years" 4]. However, it seems to us that the decision to consider typeless logic is implicitly forced by soundness of such unexpected inference rules in typed versions of TLA.
Monadic Second Order Theory of Order
In this section we recall the de nitions of the syntax and the semantics of monadic second order theory of order.
Syntax
The language L < 2 of monadic second order theory of order has a set V ar 1 of individual variables, a set V ar 2 of second order variables, a binary predicate < , the usual propositional connectives and rst and second order quanti ers. We will use t; u; v for individual variables and x; y for second order variables. The atomic formulas of L < 2 are formulas of the form: t < u and x(t). The formulas are constructed from atomic formulas by logical connectives and rst and second order quanti ers. We will write F(x; y; t; u) to indicate that the free variables of a formula F are among x; y; t; u.
Semantics
A structure K = hA; B; < K i for L < 2 consists of a set A partially ordered by < K and a set B of monadic functions from A into BOOL. An environment for individual variables is a function from the set of individual variables into A and an environment for the second order variables is a function from the set of second order variables into B. Below the satisfaction relation ; j = is de ned by induction on the structure of L < 2 formulas.
De nition 2 (Semantics of L < 2 formulas) ; j = 9 1 t: if there exists 0 such that (u) = 0 (u) for all u 6 = t and 0 ; j = 6. ; j = 9 2 x: if there exists 0 such that (y) = 0 (y) for all y 6 = x and ; 0 j = Notations: (A) In (5) the rst order existential quanti er 9 1 was de ned and in (6) the second order existential quanti er 9 2 was de ned. Symbol 9 will be used for both these quanti ers in the sequel; the ambiguity will be always resolved by context. If 9 precedes an individual (second order) variable it will refer to the rst (second) order existential quanti er. (B) Actually we had to use j = K for the satisfaction relation in a structure K and j = BTLA for the satisfaction relation of BTLA, however, in the sequel the ambiguity always will be resolved by a context.
Monadic Second Order Theory of !
The structure ! consists of the set of all natural numbers, the standard order relation on the natural numbers and the set of all monadic functions from the naturals into the booleans.
In this section letters k; m will denote natural numbers. Let (x 1 ; : : : x n ) be a formula which does not contain free occurrences of individual variables. speci es the set of all second order environments which satisfy it. Similarly, we associate a set of second order environments with (x 1 ; : : : x n ; k), where (x 1 ; : : :x n ; t) is a formula and k is a natural number.
Recall that the set fx 1 ; : : : x n g ! Nat ! BOOL of second order environments over ! is in one-one correspondence with the set of all !-strings over f0; 1g n . With a formula as above we will associate the set of !-strings which satisfy it. The language L < 2 is a very expressive formalism for specifying !-languages. In the literature many other formalisms for specifying !-languages were considered, e.g., !-regular expressions, linear time temporal logic, etc.. The !-languages which can be de ned in the above mentioned formalisms are also de nable in L < 2 . Moreover, there exists a compositional translation from the above mentioned formalisms into L < 2 . However, theorem 3 stated below will imply that there exists no compositional translation from BTLA into L < 2 .
The Extension of L < 2 by the TLA Qunti er
De nition 3 (The extension of L < 2 by 9 TLA ) The extension of L < 2 by TLA existential quanti er is de ned by adding the following rules ito the syntax and the semantics of L < 2 .
Syntax: If is a formula then 9 TLA x: is a formula. Semantics: ; j = 9 TLA x: if there exists 0 such that and 0 are stuttering equivalent up to x and ; 0 j = .
We use the notation L < 2 9 TLA ] for this extension. Remarks: (1) In section 9.2 we will comment on resticted versions of L < 2 9 TLA ] in which 9 TLA is allowed to be applied only to the formulas without free individual variables. Remark: (non-logical nature of 9 TLA ) The following examples demonstrate a non-logical nature of stuttering and of TLA existential quanti er. There exists a formula of L < 2 which does not contain a second order variable y, however for some and the following holds: ; j = is not true, yet ; j = 9 TLA y: . Take for example, x(t) for , (t) = 2 and (x) = f0; 1g.
Let TWICE be a binary predicate on the natural numbers such that TWICE(k; m) holds i k = 2 m.
Lemma 1 TWICE is de nable by an L < 2 9 TLA ] formula.
Proof: Let SUCC be a binary relation over natural numbers which is interpreted in the structure ! as SUCC(k; m) i m = k + 1.
It is well known 12] that the successor relation and the unary relation ZERO which holds only on 0 are de nable in L < 2 . Their de ning formulas are Succ(t; t 0 ) = t < t 0^: 9u:(t < u^u < t 0 ). Zero(t) = :9u:u < t Let us de ne three auxiliary predicates by formulas Alt(x; t); B(x; y; t) and Almost ? Twice(t 1 ; t 2 ).
Alt(x; t) = (9u 0 :Zero(u 0 )^x(u 0 ))^(8u 1 :8u 2 :(u 1 < t^(Succ(u 1 ; u 2 )) ! (x(u 1 ) $ :x(u 2 ))) 8u:u t ! x(u)
For even k, the language de ned by Alt(x; k) consisting of a single !-string (10) If k is not multiple of 4, then the empty language is de ned by B(x; y; k).
Almost ? Remark: Note that 9 TLA is a third order operator. There is no standard notion of de nability for third order operators. However, any reasonable notion would imply that by adding a de nable operator the expressive power of a logical language will not increase.
In this sense the above theorem can be interpreted as: 9 TLA is not de nable in L < 2 over !.
Theorem 4 The set of L < 2 9 TLA ] sentences true in ! is undecidable.
It is instructive to compare theorem 4 with
Theorem 5 (B uchi 1]) The set of L < 2 sentences true in ! is decidable.
A Non-Compositional Translation of BTLA into L < 2
In contrast to theorem 3, we will show Theorem 6 If a set of state sequences is de nable in BTLA then this set is L < 2 de nable in structure !. Moreover, there exists an algorithm which translates every BTLA formula into L < 2 formula which de nes the same set of state sequences.
Remark: In view of the remark following theorem 3 the above translation from BTLA into L < 2 cannot be compositional. Note also that theorem 5 and theorem 6 imply 3 In 8] and 12], it is attributed to Tarski that the monadic second-order theory of the structure h!; <; +i is undecidable (i.e., in the language L < 2 extended by the addition predicate). In 12], the above theorem is stated for the addition predicate. Robinson 8] has shown that the addition predicate is L < 2 -de nable from TWICE in structure !.
Theorem 7 BTLA is decidable.
In the rest of this section the sketch for the proof of theorem 6 is given. All its arguments are valid for raw BTLA. Recall 1] , that that a set L of !-strings is L < 2 de nable i L is a regular !-language (see 10] for a survey of automata on in nite objects). Moreover, there exist algorithms for translations between !-regular expressions and L < 2 formulas (see 12]). We will prove that only regular !-languages can be de ned in BTLA and that there exists an algorithm for translating BTLA formulas into equivalent !-regular expressions.
The proof is by induction on the structure of BTLA formulas. It is easy to see that every elementary BTLA formula de nes a regular !-language and it is easy to construct for every elementary formula an equivalent !-regular expression.
It is also well known that regular !-languages are closed under complementation, conjunction, projection and 2 operations. Moreover, there exists an algorithm for these operations on !-regular expressions. Hence, in order to complete the proof we have to show: for a !-regular expressions r which de nes the same language as a BTLA formula (x 1 ; : : : x n ), one can construct an !-regular expression for the !-languages de ned by the formulas 9 TLA x 1 : . Proof: Let h be a language morphism de ned as h(a) = fa n : n > 0g. It is easy to show that Stutt(L) = h(h ?1 (L)). It is easy to show that Stutt(L) = h(h ?1 (L)). Hence, the rst part of the lemma follows from the following easy generalization of a well known fact about regular languages over nite strings (see e.g. 2]) Fact: Regular !-languages are closed under regular morphisms.
Actually, the proof of this fact gives an algorithm for constructing an !-regular expression for the image (pre-image) of an !-language L from an !-regular expression that de nes L and regular expressions that de ne a morphism. From this the second part of lemma 9 follows.
6 Three Continuous Time Structures for L < 2
Let R be the set of real numbers and let < R be the standard order on R.
We use the letters ; 0 to denote real numbers.
Rabin considered the structure F = hR; F ; < R i, where F is the set of monadic functions from R into BOOL such that x 2 F i x is the characteristic function of a countable union of closed sets. Rabin has shown Theorem 10 (Rabin 5 ]) The set of L < 2 sentences true in F is decidable.
Shelah considered the structure M = hR; 2 R ; < R i, where 2 R is the set of all monadic functions from R into BOOL. He has shown Theorem 11 (Shelah 9 ]) The set of L < 2 sentences true in M is undecidable. Now we de ne signals and a signal structure on the reals. In section 8 a compositional translation of BTLA into L < 2 over signals is provided.
De nition 4 A function h from the non-negative reals into the set BOOL (a nite set ) is called a boolean signal (respectively, -signal) if there exists an unbounded increasing sequence 0 = 0 < 1 < 2 : : : < n < : : : such that h is constant on every interval i ; i+1 ).
Let SIGNAL be the set of all boolean signals. The signal structure Sig is de ned as Sig = hR + ; SIGNAL; < R i, where R + is the set of non negative reals. A signal language is a set of signals.
Theorem 12 The set of L < 2 sentences true in the signal structure Sig is decidable.
Proof: First let us note that for the restriction of the structure F to non-negative reals, theorem 10 still holds. (Below we will overload notations and notions from the structure F to its restriction on non-negative reals.) It is clear that if x is a signal then it is the characteristic function of a countable union of closed sets. Hence every signal belongs to F . It is also clear that x 2 F is a signal if and only if it satis es the formula signal(x) de ned as:
signal(x) = 8t:9t 1 > t:8t 2 :t t 2 t 1 ! (x(t) $ x(t 2 )8 t > 0:9t 1 < t:8t 2 :t 1 t 2 < t ! (x(t 1 ) $ x(t 2 )):
Below we provide an interpretation of the signal structure Sig inside structure F. De nition 5 Let L be a signal language. We say that L is speed independent if for every bijective increasing function f the following condition holds: h 2 L i h f 2 L.
Recall that in section 2 we agree to use a natural one-one correspondence between the following three sets:
1. The set Nat ! fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! BOOL of state sequences. 2. The set fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! Nat ! BOOL of second order environments for the variables fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g in the structure !. 3 . The set Nat ! f0; 1g n of !-strings over alphabet f0; 1g n In a similar way there exists a natural one-one correspondence between 4. The set fx 1 ; : : :; x n g ! SIGNAL of second order environments for the variables fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g in the structure Sig. Below we rst de ne a function Disc (discretization) which assigns to every signal a set of !-strings (!-language). Then we de ne a function Cont which assigns to every !-string a set of signals. These functions are lifted to the function between the set of !-languages and the set of signal languages. It turns out that, under this correspondence, the image of any signal language is a stuttering closed !-language. We show (lemma 15) that (1) function Cont is a bijection between the set of stuttering closed !-languages and speed independent signal languages and (2) Disc is its inverse. We also show that any L < 2 formulas without free individual variables de nes a speed independent signal language.
De nition 6 An unbounded increasing sequence 0 < 1 < : : : < i < : : : is a -sample sequence for a signal h if Let (x 1 ; : : :x n ) be a BTLA formula with free (propositional) variables in the set fx 1 : : : x n g.
Our translation which is provided below, will map to an L < 2 formula 0 (x 1 ; : : :x n ; t) with free second order variables x 1 ; : : : x n and free individual variable t. Theorem 17 stated below, justi es this translation.
The notations fu 0 =ug will be used for the substitution of u 0 for all free occurrences of u in . We will also use the following abbreviations:
NEXT(t 1 ; t 2 ; y) = t 1 < t 2^y (t 1 ) 6 = y(t 2 )^8t 0 :(t 1 t 0 < t 2 ! (y(t 0 ) = y(t 1 )) NEXT(t 1 ; t 2 ; x 1 ; : : :x n ) = t 1 < t 2^( x 1 (t 1 ) 6 = x 1 (t 2 ) _ : : : _ x n (t 1 ) 6 = x n (t 2 ))8 t 0 :(t 1 t 0 < t 2 ! (x 1 (t 0 ) = x 1 (t ? 1)^: : :^x n (t 0 ) = x n (t 1 ))) . Theorem 20 There exists no L < 2 context C ] such that for any formula (x 1 ; : : : x n ) which de nes a stuttering closed language, the formulas C ] and 9 TLA x 1 : de ne the same language over the structure !.
Remarks: Both theorems say that 9 TLA is unde nable in L < 2 . Actually, the proof of theorem 3 gives an L < 2 9 TLA ] formula which is not equivalent to any L < 2 formula. However, in L < 2 9 TLA ], the TLA existential quanti er can be applied to any formula (in particular to the formulas which contain free individual variables). Let us consider L rest the sublanguage of L < 2 9 TLA ] in which we allow to apply 9 TLA only to the formulas without free individual variables. It can be shown that every L rest formula is equivalent to an L < 2 formula (the proof is similar to the proof of theorem 6). Let L stutt rest be the sub-language of L rest in which 9 TLA can be applied only to the formulas which de ne stuttering closed languages. Theorem 20 states that 9 TLA of L stutt rest is not de nable by any L < 2 context. In particular this theorem implies that there exists no compositional translation from L stutt rest into L < 2 in the structure !.
Extension of L < 2 with Stuttering
By adding the following rules one can extend L < 2 by stutterings predicate:
Syntax: If is a formula without free individual variables then stut( ) is a formula. Semantics: ; j = stut( ) if there exists 0 such that and 0 are stuttering equivalent and ; 0 j = Note that if de nes a regular !-language then, by lemma 9, the formula stut( ) also de nes a regular !-language. Hence, for any L < 2 formula the formula stut( ) is equivalent to a L < 2 formula.
However, note that there is no L < 2 formula STUT(x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 ) such that ; j = STUT((x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 ) if and only if the restriction of to fx 1 ; x 2 g is stuttering equivalent
to the restriction of to fy 1 ; y 2 g. (This follows from observation that the !-language over f0; 1g 4 de ned by STUT is not !-regular.)
Note also that by extending L < 2 by this third order predicate STUT we can express the predicate TWICE. (The proof of this is similar to the proof of lemma 1 and is omitted here.)
